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TEACHING TRADEMARK THEORY THROUGH THE LENS OF 
DISTINCTIVENESS 
MARK P. McKENNA* 
INTRODUCTION 
Trademark law is a theoretically rich field, and courses covering the area 
are now staple offerings in law schools.1  But in my experience, trademark law 
can be difficult to teach because many intellectual property casebooks organize 
trademark-related materials ineffectively.  This is particularly a problem with 
many of the survey casebooks,2 which tend to approach trademark law the 
same way they approach patent and copyright law, systematically marching 
through statutory requirements.  This makes trademark law difficult for many 
students because trademark law has a different texture than other areas of 
intellectual property, and it springs from a wider variety of sources. 
Patent rights are creatures of federal statute,3 and cases interpreting the 
Patent Act overwhelmingly are governed by precedent from one federal court 
of appeals—the Federal Circuit.4  While there is no analogous single appellate 
 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Saint Louis University.  © 2007 Mark P. McKenna.  This Article is 
published under a Creative Commons License, Attribution Non-Commercial Share-Alike (BY-
NC-SA).  See http://creativecommons.org/about/licenses. 
 1. Kenneth L. Port, Intellectual Property Curricula in the United States, 46 IDEA 165, 170 
(2005) (documenting courses in trademark law at 106 schools as of 2005). 
 2. By “survey casebooks” I mean books that purport to cover the intellectual property 
waterfront (with sections covering at least patent, copyright, and trademark) as opposed to books 
focused particularly on trademark law. 
 3. The Patent Act contains no express preemption clause, but the Supreme Court has held 
state laws that afforded patent-like protection preempted under the Supremacy Clause.  See 
Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 168 (1989). 
 4. Since it was created in 1982, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has had 
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over appeals arising under the patent laws.  Federal Courts 
Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982) (establishing the Federal 
Circuit); 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2000).  There is one small exception to the Federal Circuit’s 
hegemony; the Federal Circuit does not have appellate jurisdiction over cases in which the patent 
issues arise only by way of counterclaim.  See Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation 
Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826 (2002) (holding that Federal Circuit does not have appellate jurisdiction 
over case in which complaint did not state patent law claim but answer contained patent law 
counterclaim). 
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court for copyright cases, copyright claims, like patent claims, are litigated 
exclusively in federal courts.5  Copyright law also derives predominantly from 
federal statute, particularly since Congress enacted the Copyright Act of 1976.6  
Under the previous Copyright Act of 1909,7 federal copyright protection was 
available only for works that had been published,8 and publication generally 
required distribution of copies to the public.9  Because a good deal of creative 
content remained unpublished under this definition, federal copyright 
protection was available for only a fraction of the works produced prior to the 
1976 Act’s effective date.  Unpublished works were left to state law, which 
therefore played a more significant role in the copyright scheme.  The 1976 
Act, however, dramatically expanded the role of federal law, at the expense of 
state law, by introducing federal copyright protection upon fixation of a work 
in tangible form.10  As a result of this expansion, state law protection is valid 
with respect to works created under the 1976 Act only when the works are 
unfixed or where the state law rights are not “equivalent” to any of the 
exclusive rights of copyright.11  Modern copyright law therefore focuses 
overwhelmingly, and increasingly, on federal statutory law. 
Federal statutory law is much less significant in trademark law.  There is a 
federal statute—the Lanham Act12—that broadly regulates the use of 
trademarks, but the statute does relatively little conceptual work in defining the 
nature and scope of trademark rights.  Many of the foundational concepts of 
trademark law were developed by courts before the Lanham Act was enacted,13 
and Congress intended the Lanham Act to codify much of this earlier common 
 
 5. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2000). 
 6. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–805 (2000). 
 7. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, repealed by Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. 
No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–805 (2000)). 
 8. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 9, 35 Stat. 1075, 1077 (repealed 1976) (“[A]ny person 
entitled thereto by this Act may secure copyright for his work by publication thereof with notice 
of copyright . . . .”). 
 9. For this reason, public performance of a work is not sufficient to claim rights under the 
Copyright Act of 1909.  See Estate of of Martin Luther King, Jr. v. CBS, Inc., 194 F.3d 1211, 
1217 (11th Cir. 1999) (“A performance, no matter how broad the audience, is not a 
publication . . . .”). 
 10. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (“Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship 
fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . . .”). 
 11. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 301(b)(1), (3).  The Copyright Act also expressly preempts state law 
that provides protection “equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of 
copyright as specified by section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium 
of expression and come within the subject matter of copyright.”  17 U.S.C. § 301(a). 
 12. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141 (2000). 
 13. See Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 Notre Dame 
L. Rev. 1839, 1887–96 (2007). 
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law.14  Consequently, early trademark decisions have continuing relevance, 
even in cases involving registered trademarks, and whether those cases were 
decided as a matter of statutory or common law. 
Some casebook authors have failed to appreciate the relative insignificance 
of the Lanham Act, however, because they have focused on another trend in 
trademark law.  What these authors notice is that state law has played 
relatively little substantive role in modern trademark law, aside from the 
dilution context.  While courts generally have not deemed state law preempted 
by the Lanham Act, at least where state law does not conflict with federal 
law,15 courts frequently have interpreted state law under the same substantive 
standards as federal law.16  Moreover, because courts have interpreted § 43(a) 
 
 14. See. Robert. C. Denicola, Some Thoughts on the Dynamics of Federal Trademark 
Legislation and the Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, 59 Law & Contemp. Probs. 75, 79–80 
(1996) (“Putting aside statutory innovations directly linked to the public notice provided by the 
Act’s registration system, the Lanham Act codifie[d] the basic common law principles governing 
both the subject matter and the scope of protection.”) 
 15. See Colonial Penn Group, Inc. v. Colonial Deposit Co., 834 F.2d 229, 234 n.3 (1st Cir. 
1987) (“It cannot be argued that the Lanham Act has completely preempted state common law 
service mark protection.”); Spartan Food Sys., Inc. v. HFS Corp., 813 F.2d 1279, 1284 (4th Cir. 
1987) (“The Lanham Act does not preempt all state law pertaining to trademarks.”); Keebler Co. 
v. Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366, 372 n.3 (1st Cir. 1980) (“The Lanham Act does not 
preempt the states’ ability to recognize and protect trademark rights . . . .   The Supremacy Clause 
bars only state statutes or doctrine that would permit the sort of confusing or deceptive practices 
the draftsman of the Lanham Act sought to prevent.”).  To the extent they have focused on 
conflicting state and federal law, courts have been more concerned about state laws that appear to 
narrow federal rights.  See Davidoff Extension S.A. v. Davidoff Comercio E Industria Ltda., 747 
F. Supp. 122, 126–27 (D.P.R. 1990) (holding principle that state trademark law cannot defeat the 
rights of a federal registrant applies with respect to Puerto Rican law); American Auto. Ass’n v. 
AAA Ins. Agency, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 787, 798 (W.D. Tex. 1985) (articulating rule that state law 
cannot defeat or limit protection given to federally registered marks). 
 16. The United States Trademark Association drafted the first Model State Trademark Bill in 
1949, which it patterned after the Lanham Act in most substantive respects.  See 3 J. THOMAS 
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 22:5 (4th ed. 2007).  
By 1992, when the Model Bill was redrafted, forty-six states had used the Model Trademark Bill 
as the basis for their state trademark legislation.  See id.; MODEL STATE TRADEMARK BILL 
(1992), reprinted in MCCARTHY supra, § 22:9.  Courts, therefore, often rely on federal case law 
in interpreting state laws based on the Model State Trademark Bill.  See, e.g., Rolls-Royce 
Motors, Ltd. v. A & A Fiberglass, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 689, 693–94 (N.D. Ga. 1977); Tio Pepe, Inc. 
v. El Tio Pepe de Miami Restaurant, Inc., 523 So. 2d 1158, 1159–60 n.6 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1988) (holding that case law applying the federal Lanham Act should be regarded as persuasive 
authority for interpreting and construing the state statute).  At the same time, federal courts often 
lump their analysis of state law claims into their discussion of federal law claims, noting the 
overlapping standards.  See, e.g., Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Dooney & Burke, Inc., 454 F.3d 108, 
119 (2d Cir. 2006) (“We analyze claims under New York’s unfair competition statute in a similar 
fashion to how we analyze claims under the Lanham Act.”).  Some greater variation may exist 
between federal and state dilution laws, in large part because there was no federal dilution 
protection before 1996.  See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 430–32 (2003) 
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of the Lanham Act to allow protection of unregistered trademarks and trade 
dress,17 parties can assert rights under the federal statute irrespective of 
registration status.  These developments suggest to some increasing 
federalization of trademark law, and on some level that narrative is accurate.  
But this federalization is a fairly superficial one, and focusing too much on the 
statute overstates its conceptual significance. 
Because the Lanham Act plays such a different role in trademark law than 
the relevant federal statutes do in patent and copyright law, trademark courses 
ought to be organized differently than other intellectual property courses.  In 
particular, trademark courses should not initially focus on statutory 
requirements for registrability.  For one thing, trademark registration confers 
few substantive advantages.  Unlike patent rights, trademark rights are a 
function of use rather than registration,18 and registered and unregistered 
trademarks receive mostly identical protection.19  Moreover, while some 
validity inquiries are idiosyncratic to the registration system—the bar on 
registration of scandalous and immoral matter, for example20—many of the 
requirements for registrability echo the common law standards of 
protectability. 
Consequently, trademark courses should begin with foundational 
principles rather than particular statutory provisions.  Specifically, trademark 
classes should begin with the concept of distinctiveness, perhaps the most 
foundational of all trademark concepts.  Distinctiveness has obvious doctrinal 
significance in its own right as the basis for distinguishing protectable 
trademarks from other matter.21  The concept of distinctiveness also overlaps 
significantly with that of trademark strength, which is one of the factors that 
 
(contrasting language of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1996 with that of state statutes 
that required only likelihood of dilution).  Since Congress enacted the Trademark Dilution 
Revision Act in 2006, however, the extent to which state and federal dilution law now diverge is 
a bit unclear.  See Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006)). 
 17. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992) (stating that “it is 
common ground that § 43(a) protects qualifying unregistered trademarks and that the general 
principles qualifying a mark for registration under § 2 of the Lanham Act are for the most part 
applicable in determining whether an unregistered mark is entitled to protection under § 43(a)”). 
 18. While copyright protection technically attaches at the moment an author fixes her work 
in a tangible medium of expression, registration is a prerequisite to filing suit under the Copyright 
Act for all works created in the U.S.  See 17 U.S.C. § 411 (2000). 
 19. The one notable substantive advantage of federal registration is the opportunity to 
achieve incontestable status, which limits the grounds on which a defendant can challenge the 
validity of one’s trademark rights.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1115. 
 20. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a). 
 21. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9–11 (2d Cir. 1976) 
(setting out classic spectrum of distinctiveness). 
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determines the scope of a party’s rights.22  Pedagogically, distinctiveness 
makes sense as a starting point because it is the perfect vehicle through which 
to teach trademark theory. 
Trademark law has long struggled to balance the interests of consumers 
and producers.  Sometimes the interests of both groups coincide such that 
protection in a particular context benefits both.  But these interests coincide 
much less often than courts and commentators often pretend.  In fact, a variety 
of doctrines can be examined from the different perspectives of consumers and 
producers, and many of them make more or less sense depending on the 
perspective one takes.  The concept of distinctiveness is susceptible to 
evaluation from either perspective, and while the interests of consumers and 
producers tend to converge on this issue, forcing students to articulate both 
perspectives proves remarkably helpful down the road. 
I.  WHAT IS DISTINCTIVENESS? 
The concept of distinctiveness plays a critical doctrinal role in trademark 
law because it differentiates designations that warrant trademark protection 
from those that do not.  Distinctiveness in this context refers to the extent to 
which a claimed designation conveys to consumers information about the 
source of products or services as opposed to merely conveying product-related 
information.  Protectable trademarks tell consumers something about who 
stands behind a product or service—they are distinctive of the source of the 
relevant products or services.23 
Courts traditionally have evaluated the distinctiveness of word marks by 
determining the meaning of the term at issue in the context in which it is used 
 
 22. Trademark strength is one of the factors courts generally consider in the likelihood of 
confusion analysis.  See, e.g., Polaroid Corp. v. Polrad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 
1961).  Strength refers both to a term’s inherent distinctiveness and to its actual distinctiveness in 
the commercial marketplace, and courts regularly note that strong marks are entitled to a broader 
scope of protection.  See, e.g., Freedom Card, Inc. v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 432 F.3d 463, 472 
(3d Cir. 2005) (“In evaluating the strength of the mark . . ., we examine: (1) the mark’s 
distinctiveness or conceptual strength (the inherent features of the mark) and (2) its commercial 
strength (factual evidence of marketplace recognition).”) (internal citation omitted); Exxon Corp. 
v. Texas Motor Exch. of Houston, Inc., 628 F.2d 500, 504 (5th Cir. 1980) (“In short, the more 
distinctive a trademark, the greater its ‘strength.’  The strength of a trademark is important in 
determining the scope of protection that is granted.”); AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 
341, 349 (9th Cir. 1979) (“A strong mark is inherently distinctive, for example, an arbitrary or 
fanciful mark; it will be afforded the widest ambit of protection from infringing uses.”). 
 23. In the language of the statute, a mark is distinctive when it “identif[ies] and 
distinguish[es] [a party’s] goods . . .  from those manufactured or sold by others” and “indicate[s] 
the source of the goods.”  15 U.S.C. § 1127.   Under modern law, consumers need not be able to 
name the source of a product or service; it is sufficient that consumers expect all goods with the 
same mark to emanate from a single, if anonymous, source.  See id. (requiring indication of 
source, “even if that source is unknown”); see also MCCARTHY, supra note 16, § 3:9. 
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and placing it in one of four categories, in ascending order of distinctiveness: 
(1) generic, (2) descriptive, (3) suggestive, or (4) arbitrary or fanciful.24  An 
arbitrary term is one with an understood meaning but which is used in an 
unfamiliar way—IVORY as applied to soap, for example.25  Fanciful terms, 
sometimes called coined terms, are made up terms like XEROX or KODAK 
that have no ordinary, non-trademark meaning.26  Arbitrary and fanciful terms 
are deemed inherently distinctive and protectable without need of evidence of 
actual consumer understanding, as are terms that are merely suggestive of a 
product’s features or characteristics.27 
A descriptive term, one that describes a product or its features, is not 
inherently distinctive, but it may become distinctive if it acquires “secondary 
meaning.”28  “Secondary meaning exists only if a significant number of 
prospective purchasers understand the term, when used in connection with a 
particular kind of good, service or business, not merely in its lexicographic 
sense, but also as an indication of association with a particular, even if 
anonymous, entity.”29  A generic term can never serve as a trademark because 
it is the generally recognized name of a product or service (car, for example) 
and therefore does not signify a particular source.30 
This categorical approach works well with word marks because words 
have generally recognized meanings and it is relatively easy for courts to 
determine whether and how those meanings relate to the products or services 
with which they are used.  But product design and packaging features rarely 
have such generally understood meanings, and as a result, the traditional 
framework is less helpful in determining whether trade dress features are 
sufficiently distinctive to warrant protection.31  Nevertheless, as a conceptual 
matter, the task is the same with respect to trade dress as it is with word 
marks—even if doing so requires different tools, a court must determine 
 
 24. Abercrombie & Fitch, 537 F.2d at 9. 
 25. See Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 791 (5th Cir. 1983). 
 26. See id. 
 27. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992); Abercrombie & Fitch, 
537 F.2d at 11. 
 28. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 769. 
 29. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13 cmt. e (1995). 
 30. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 768. 
 31. For this reason, and because of the potential for trade dress protection to conflict with 
patent protection of design features, courts have created additional considerations in this context.  
First, the Supreme Court has distinguished between product design and product packaging and 
declared that, with respect to product design features, parties may not rely on presumptions of 
source significance but must demonstrate it by providing evidence of secondary meaning.  Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 212–15 (2000).  Second, courts have long 
held, and the Lanham Act now explicitly states, that functional product features, even those with 
source significance, are ineligible for trademark protection.  See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(e)(5), 
1125(a)(3). 
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whether claimed features signify source, because source signification is what 
makes something a trademark. 
II.  WHY DOES DISTINCTIVENESS MATTER? 
Source designation—distinctiveness—is the defining characteristic of 
protectable trademarks because trademark law’s most fundamental goal is to 
preserve the integrity of source indicators.  But stating the issue this way only 
begs a further question: why is it important for courts to intervene in 
commercial activities to preserve the meaning of words or other designations?  
As it turns out, the answer to that question depends to some extent on the 
perspective from which one views trademark law, and courts have long 
struggled to balance two sometimes competing perspectives. 
A. Distinctiveness from the Search Costs Perspective 
Courts and commentators now regularly claim that the goal of trademark 
law is to improve the quality of information in the marketplace and thereby 
reduce consumer search costs.32  Trademarks, on this theory, are means by 
which consumers organize information about products or services.  By 
preserving the integrity of these symbols, trademark law protects consumers 
from being deceived into buying products they do not want and allows 
consumers to rely on source indicators generally to reduce their costs of 
searching for products in the market.33  Proponents of this view sometimes 
describe as a second purpose of trademark law protection of producers’ 
goodwill.  When they do, however, they tend to describe this secondary goal in 
market efficiency terms, arguing that trademark law seeks to protect producer 
goodwill in order to encourage investment in product quality,34 which 
ultimately benefits consumers. 
 
 32. See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (stating that 
trademark law “‘reduce[s] the customer’s costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions,’” 
and “helps assure a producer that it (and not an imitating competitor) will reap the financial, 
reputation-related rewards associated with a desirable product”); WILLIAM M. LANDES & 
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF  INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 166–68 
(2003); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the 
Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 778 (2004) (arguing that the normative goal of trademark law is 
to foster the flow of information in markets, thereby reducing search costs for consumers). 
 33. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 32, at 166–68; Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark 
Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 417 (1999) (arguing that trademark “[o]wnership [is] assigned 
to the person who adopt[s] the mark for her trade, not because she . . . created it or its favorable 
associations, but because such person [is] conveniently placed and strongly motivated to 
vindicate the broader public interest in a mark’s ability to identify accurately the source of the 
goods to which it [is] attached”). 
 34. See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 163–64 (stating that trademark law “‘reduce[s] the customer’s 
costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions,’” and “helps assure a producer that it (and 
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From this consumer-based perspective, limiting trademark protection to 
distinctive terms makes sense because search costs are reduced only when 
consumers can consistently match products or services with their source.  
When a designation indicates to consumers the source of the products or 
services with which it is used, consumers know who to credit with positive 
experiences and who to blame for bad experiences.  When they later encounter 
other products or services that employ the same mark, consumers can use their 
past experiences—or those of others from whom they have learned—to 
evaluate the new products or services.  This ability to use a mark as a shortcut 
evaluative tool is particularly valuable, as many have noted, when the new 
product or service at issue has qualities that are not directly observable.35  In 
those cases, consumers can evaluate the product or service by proxy by 
transferring the knowledge they have about the source to the new product or 
service.36 
This type of information transfer can only occur when a designation 
consistently refers to the same source across encounters.  If a term never 
indicates to consumers the source of a product, or if it indicates different 
sources at different times or to different consumers, consumers will not be able 
to rely on past experiences to give them information about the quality or 
reliability of the product or service they encounter.  The requirement that terms 
be distinctive of source therefore can be understood as an attempt to ensure 
that claimed designations receive protection only when consumers can use 
those designations to reduce their search costs.37 
 
not an imitating competitor) will reap the financial, reputation-related rewards associated with a 
desirable product”) (internal citation omitted); Union Nat’l Bank of Tex., Laredo, Tex. v. Union 
Nat’l Bank of Tex., Austin, Tex., 909 F.2d 839, 844 (5th Cir. 1990) (“The idea is that trademarks 
are ‘distinguishing’ features which lower consumer search costs and encourage higher quality 
production by discouraging free-riders.”); Eric Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet 
Trademark Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 507, 554–55 (2005) (arguing that trademark law serves dual 
purposes: protecting consumers from confusion when making purchasing decisions and 
protecting producers’ investments in quality that creates consumer goodwill towards them). 
 35. See, e.g., Ann Bartow, Likelihood of Confusion, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 721, 729 (2004) 
(“[T]rademarks serve the interests of consumers by reducing search costs and allowing buyers to 
‘make rational purchasing and repurchasing decisions with speed and assurance,’ while 
simultaneously ‘creat[ing] incentives for firms to create and market products of desirable 
qualities, particularly when these qualities are not observable before purchase.’” (quoting 
Marshall A. Leaffer, The New World of International Trademark Law, 2 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. 
REV. 1, 5–6 (1998))). 
 36. This assumes, of course, that the fact that a particular entity stands behind products over 
a period of time is a reliable indicator of consistent quality. 
 37. More specifically, the rule that certain terms can be deemed inherently distinctive and 
protectable without evidence of secondary meaning might be seen as incentive for producers to 
adopt as their trademarks designations that are particularly likely to help consumers reduce their 
search costs. 
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B. The Producer Perspective 
Trademark law traditionally limited protection to what are now called 
distinctive marks for a different reason.  As nineteenth and early twentieth 
century courts repeatedly made clear, the original purpose of trademark law 
was to protect a party from illegitimate attempts to divert its trade.38  When a 
plaintiff brought a trademark infringement claim, “‘[t]he gist of the 
complaint . . . [was] that the defendant, by placing the complainant’s trade-
mark on goods not manufactured by the plaintiff, ha[d] induced persons to 
purchase them, relying on the trade-mark as proving them to be of plaintiff’s 
manufacture.’”39 
From the point of view of a producer, terms that indicate source can be 
used as a calling card.  When consumers associate a designation with a 
particular producer, those consumers can seek out a trusted producer by 
looking for the known designation in the marketplace.40  Consumers cannot, 
however, use as a calling card terms that they do not associate with particular 
producers.  And if consumers do not rely on a designation to indicate source, 
junior users who employ the same or similar designations cannot deceive 
consumers into buying their goods in place of the senior user’s. 
Consequently, from a producer perspective, the requirement of 
distinctiveness can be understood as an attempt to identify terms that might be 
used by competitors to pass off their products as those of another.  Indeed, that 
was the original purpose of limiting protection to distinctive designations.  But 
the requirement of distinctiveness makes sense even from a broader producer 
perspective that would encompass concerns about reputational damage that 
might result from consumer confusion about the source of non-competitive 
goods.  For consumers to hold a mark owner responsible for the quality of 
another’s goods, they must have some reason to suspect there is a relationship 
between the parties.  If a claimed designation does not indicate source, there 
will be no reason for consumers to rely on the designation to attribute blame. 
 
 38. See, e.g., Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. 311, 322–23 (1871) (“[I]n all cases where rights to 
the exclusive use of a trade-mark are invaded, it is invariably held that the essence of the wrong 
consists in the sale of the goods of one manufacturer or vendor as those of another; and that it is 
only when this false representation is directly or indirectly made that the party who appeals to the 
court of equity can have relief.  This is the doctrine of all the authorities.”); Coats v. Holbrook, 7 
N.Y. Ch. Ann. 713, 717 (1845) (holding that a person is not allowed to imitate the product of 
another and “thereby attract to himself the patronage that without such deceptive use of such 
names . . . would have inured to the benefit of that other person”). 
 39. Am. Washboard Co. v. Saginaw Mfg. Co., 103 F. 281, 284 (6th Cir. 1900) (quoting Lord 
Cranworth in Leather Cloth Co. v. Am. Leather Cloth Co., (1865) 11 H.L.C. 523, 536, 11 Eng. 
Rep. 1435, 1441 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.)). 
 40. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 32, at 167. 
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C. The Consumer and Producer Perspectives in Trademark Law Generally 
It may not seem particularly important to articulate both of these 
perspectives in the context of distinctiveness, since they seem generally to 
suggest the same rules.  But distinctiveness is a useful vehicle for fleshing out 
the consumer and producer perspectives because they are relatively easy to 
understand in this context.  And thinking about trademark law from both 
perspectives is important since a variety of other doctrines make more sense 
from one perspective or the other. 
From a consumer protection perspective, for example, dilution seems a 
striking departure from traditional trademark principles.  Dilution claims allow 
certain trademark owners—the owners of “famous”41 trademarks—to assert 
claims in situations when no consumers are confused about the defendant’s 
use.42  It does so despite the fact that trademark theory focuses predominantly 
on preventing consumer confusion in order to reduce search costs.43  But while 
dilution claims vindicate a different producer interest than confusion-based 
claims, particularly confusion-based claims focused on trade diversion, these 
claims seem less radical from the producer perspective.44 
Dilution is not the only doctrine that might look different depending on 
one’s perspective.  Some modern confusion doctrines like post-sale confusion 
and initial interest confusion can seem difficult to explain from a consumer 
perspective.45  Confusion of those who encounter a product in contexts 
 
 41. Fame is an explicit requirement for federal dilution protection, although some state 
dilution provisions do not, on their face, limit protection to famous marks.  See 15 U.S.C. § 
1125(c)(1) (2000). 
 42. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(1) (West 2007) (“the owner of a famous mark that is 
distinctive . . . shall be entitled to an injunction against another person who . . . commences use of 
a mark or trade name in commerce that is likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by 
tarnishment of the famous mark, regardless of the presence or absence of actual or likely 
confusion, of competition, or of actual economic injury”).  The concept of dilution is generally 
attributed to Frank Schechter and his article The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 
HARV. L. REV. 813 (1927).  Schechter focused on distinctive marks that had been “added to 
rather than withdrawn from the human vocabulary . . . and have, from the very beginning, been 
associated in the public mind with a particular product, not with a variety of products, and have 
created in the public consciousness an impression or symbol of the excellence of the particular 
product in question.”  Id. at 829.  He argued that the owners of such marks should be entitled to 
preserve the distinctiveness or “selling power” of their marks by asserting claims against others 
who would associate the mark with a second producer.  See id. at 830–33.  Dilution developed 
sporadically through the twentieth century, initially adopted by a number of states, but resisted by 
courts, and only recognized at the federal level in 1996.  See MCCARTHY, supra note 16, § 24:67. 
 43. See supra notes 32–36 and accompanying text. 
 44. I am not suggesting here that dilution claims necessarily vindicate producer interests that 
deserve protection, only that the policy discussion has a different texture when the producer 
perspective is recognized. 
 45. Post-sale confusion cases focus on the possible confusion of individuals who encounter a 
product after it has been purchased, ostensibly on the theory that those viewers might be confused 
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removed from the time or space in which purchasing decisions are made is 
much less directly related to search costs.  Decisions recognizing such 
confusion as actionable clearly seem more concerned with a producer interest 
in exclusive use of an attractive mark.  In fact, though McCarthy initially 
attempts to characterize post-sale confusion in consumer search terms, he 
ultimately concedes that the real concern is that “consumers could acquire the 
prestige value of the senior user’s product by buying the copier’s cheap 
imitation.”46  The producer interests in these cases unquestionably is a different 
one than courts have traditionally recognized, but these decisions can at least 
be discussed intelligently (and honestly) in terms of the producer interests at 
stake. 
These are but a few examples of situations in which perspective matters in 
trademark law.  Students can engage in much richer discussion of these and 
other situations having articulated and considered both perspectives, and 
distinctiveness is an effective context in which to introduce these perspectives.  
Thus, in addition to its doctrinal significance, distinctiveness provides a solid 
theoretical foundation for a trademark course. 
 
about the origin of the product they see.  See, e.g., Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron 
& Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc., 221 F.2d 464, 466 (2d Cir. 1955).  Initial interest 
confusion cases focus on uses of a trademark to gain the attention of consumers initially, even if 
any confusion about a possible relationship between the trademark owner and the other party is 
dispelled before purchase.  See, e.g., Brookfield Commc’ns v. West Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 
1036, 1062 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 46. MCCARTHY, supra note 16, § 23:7, at 23–37. 
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